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I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Community today is facing exciting opportunities and 
challenging problems. The twin conferences on monetary and political 
union envision a degree of European integration never aspired before. 
While the Community is still adjusting to German reunifaction, se- 
veral non-member countries expressed interest in future membership. 
At the same time, the EC plays a leading role in the transformation 
of  Eastern Europe. By  the end of  this decade, the Community and 
the whole of Europe will have changed fundamentally, provided that 
world conflicts or an economic recession do not reverse the current 
momentum towards integration. 
With all these new developments, it does not come as a surprise 
that attention gradually moved away from the completion of  the in- 
ternal market, the so-called "1992 program". This does not imply that 
no progress is being made in this domain. Quite on the contrary, the 
creation of  the internal market is a success. On November  15, 1990 
almost two thirds of the 1992 directives were approved by the Council 
of Ministers. With the exceptions of fiscal harmonization and free mo- 
vement of  individuals, breakthroughs were realized in virtually every 
important area of  liberalization. Most observers would credit the li- 
beralization program for at least part of the remarkable economic ex- 
pansion  in Europe during the last couple of  years. 
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are the powerful yet  simple principles underlying the liberalization. 
More specifically, the removal of  internal barriers  in the industrial 
sector is based on mutual recognition. This principle establishes that, 
once a product meets the standards of  one EC country, it cannot be 
denied access to another market. The very similar idea of home coun- 
try control lies at the heart of the liberalization of the financial sector 
within the EC. Home country control means that a financial company 
can conduct its activities in all EC countries provided that it is ap- 
proved by  the authorities of  its country of  origin. 
Home country control and mutual recognition have in common that 
a supplier is granted access to a foreign market based on the standards 
and regulations of  its own country. This reflects a radical departure 
from the situation previously existing within the EC as well as from 
current practices in international trade. The application of these prin- 
ciples is limited only by  essential EC requirements specifying mini- 
mum conditions for national standards throughout the Community. 
This paper deals with theory and facts about home country control, 
mutual recognition and essential requirements. Section I1 discusses 
how the mentioned principles have been applied to the industrial and 
financial sector. In Section 111, we consider the role of  the liberali- 
zation principles in eliminating what Winters (1990) defines as cost- 
increasing frictions on inter-member flows. In this interpretation, na- 
tional standards and regulations increase costs of  foreign firms and 
thus protect domestic companies against competition from other EC 
countries. Section IV takes the alternative view that standards and 
regulations guarantee a minimum quality level of  the products and 
companies admitted to the domestic market. They can therefore be 
used by companies to establish a quality reputation. In a final section, 
some concluding comments are made. 
11.  INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 
A. M~ltual  Recognition of  Technical, Environmental and  Health 
Standards 
Many of  the directives of  the 1992 program are aimed at removing 
national technical, environmental and health standards that form an 
impediment to free trade among EC countries. To achieve this ob- 
jective,  the principle of  mutual recognition was adopted in most of the directives. This principle guarantees that when, say, a pharmaceu- 
tical product is approved in Spain, it can also be sold in Germany even 
if  it does not meet German standards. By now, this principle has found 
a wide range of  important  applications. To mention just  a few, the 
suppliers of telecommunication equipment and electronics are no lon- 
ger required to adjust to the standards of  each individual EC country 
and pharmaceutical companies avoid costly delays arising from getting 
the same drug approved  in  different markets. 
The basis for mutual recognition stems from two important rulings 
by,  the European Court of  Justice. In the "Cassis de Dijon" case of 
1979, French exporters attacked German health regulations on food 
products which effectively banned the sale of  cassis on the German 
market. The European Court ruled that technical and commercial re- 
gulations may not give rise to trade barriers unless they are necessary 
for safeguarding a particular public interest. 
The decision  in the case of  "The German Beer Purity Law"  or 
"Reinheitsgebot" (1987) greatly strengthened the power of  the mu- 
tual recognition principle in real world  applications. German regu- 
lations ruled out the sale of  foreign beer in Germany on the ground 
that it contained hazardous chemicals. The European Court judged 
that member states cannot invoke public health considerations to jus- 
tify measures that act as import restrictions unless they can objectively 
prove that the product is harmful to health. Important is that the bur- 
den of proof is unambiguously placed on the importing member state 
which  has  to present  compelling  reasons for maintaining trade re- 
stricting standards. 
The extension of  mutual recognition to environmental considera- 
tions is not settled yet as is exemplified by  the ruling on the "Danish 
compulsory bottle deposit". Denmark introduced a law in 1981 which 
required that beer and soft drinks be sold only in returnable bottles, 
with  a compulsory deposit. Brewers from other countries protested 
because the costs of  recycling bottles reduced profits. The European 
Commission took the case to court arguing that the Danes were im- 
posing a disproportionate level of  environmental protection. In Sep- 
tember 1988, the court backed Denmark invoking the environmental 
provisions of  the Single European Act. B. Home   count^ Control 
-1 he liberalization oi iinancial markets within the EC is based on the 
principle of home country control. Earlier, we defined home country 
control as the right of  a financial company to operate in all EC  coun- 
tries provided that it is approved by  the authorities of  its country of 
origin. For example, a British bank, which is approved by the British 
regulatory authorities, does not have to meet German or French stan- 
dards if  it wants to operate in Germany or France. The home country 
principle constitutes a marked step towards liberalization when com- 
pared to the prevailing system of host country control. With host coun- 
try control financial institutions have to conform to the standards of 
each of  the countries where they sell their products. In the previous 
example, the British bank needs approval of  the German and French 
authorities in order to market its products in Germany and France. 
While representing substantial progress towards an internal mar- 
ket, the home country control principle is applied quite differently in 
various parts of the financial sector. In what follows, we consider the 
cases of  the banking  and insurance sector. 
Without any doubt, the adoption of  the second banking directive 
represents a major breakthrough in the creation of  a fully integrated 
financial market. This directive establishes the principle of  a single 
banking licence for an extensive list of banking activities including all 
forms of  transaction in securities. It couples this licence to the home 
country control principle. In effect, the banking licence is granted by 
the home country of  the bank according to the laws and regulations 
prevailing there, provided that these laws at least meet EC essential 
standards. Supervision of  the bank is also the responsibility  of  the 
home country authority. There are some exceptions to this principle : 
host control continues to apply for the supervision of  liquidity, admi- 
nistrative  and  accounting  procedures.  Host  country  governments 
would also remain responsible for monetary policy. At this stage, it 
is too early to say to what degree these exceptions weaken the prin- 
ciple of  home country  control. 
The insurance business consists of  two main branches : "life" and 
"non-life" insurance. The liberalization  in  the European  insurance 
sector is well under way. However, the application of the home coun- 
try principle is restricted  in some important ways. 
The Second Non-Life Insurance Coordination Directive, adopted 
in 1988, gives insurance companies the freedom to provide services to cover  "large risks"  in  other member states without  being  esta- 
blished  there, on the basis of  home country control. Large risks are 
primarily incurred by companies. In effect, the directive defines large 
risks in terms of  total employment, turnover and balance sheet of  the 
client company. 
Unlike the banking directive, there is therefore a clear limit on the 
applicability of  home country control. Mass risks, which are incurred 
by individual persons, are not covered. This distinction follows a Court 
ruling of  December 4, 1986 and is based on the idea that clients for 
large risk insurance are able to form their own opinion about the com- 
pany offering the policy and do not require special protection from 
the supervisory authority in  the state where  the risk  is  situated. In 
spite of  this court ruling, the Commission recently proposed a third 
non-life insurance  directive. This directive would  extend the home 
country control principle  to small risks. 
The second life insurance directive establishes a restricted version 
of  the home country principle in the area of life insurance and is per- 
haps better interpreted as a combination of  home and host country 
rule. When the insurance taker, on his own initiative, contacts a fo- 
reign insurance company that is not established in his country of re- 
sidence, the insurance contract is  subject to the laws of  the home 
country of  the insurance company. On the other hand, the contract 
falls under the national legislation  of  the insurance taker when the 
foreign insurance company "actively" seeks to sell its insurance po- 
licies outside its home market. 
This arrangement hopes to establish the opportunity for insurance 
takers to obtain the most interesting insurance policies available on 
the EC market, while at the same time protecting consumers against 
aggressive marketing strategies of  foreign insurance companies. Ne- 
vertheless, the restrictions on market penetration by  foreign compa- 
nies run the risk of  protecting the market power of  domestic compa- 
nies on their home market. Moreover, the distinction between the ini- 
tiative of  the insurer and the insured is not easily made and is com- 
plicated further by the fact that independent insurance brokers are 
allowed to intermediate between consumers and non-resident foreign 
insurance companies. C. Essential Requirements 
The principles of  mutual recognition  and home country control are 
supplemented by EC essential requirements that are laid down in EC 
directives. Those directives specify minima to which the national stan- 
dards and regulations of  all Community countries have to conform. 
Individual member countries are left free to impose tougher standards 
but cannot refuse market access to products that satisfy EC essential 
requirements. 
In the area of technical, safety and pollution standards, specialized 
European agencies, (e.g. CEN, CENELEC and ETSI), in which na- 
tional certification institutions are represented, determine the tech- 
nical specifications that have to be satisfied to meet EC essential re- 
quirements. Ultimately, companies can choose between European or 
national certification provided that national standards comply with 
EC standards. 
EC essential requirements for the financial sector guarantee the 
solidity of  financial institutions active on the European market and 
facilitate the harmonization of  ground rules across member states. 
By now, a wide range of essential requirements have been approved 
for banks, insurance companies, investment firms, capital and stock 
markets. A detailed description can be found in Abraham (1990a) but 
three examples for the banking sector convey the general picture. 
To obtain the banking passport  required  to benefit from home 
country control, initial bank capital should account for at least 5 mil- 
lion ECU. Banks are obliged to respect the EC directive on own funds 
of  credit institutions which defines internal and external elements of 
own funds and specifies that external elements should comprise no 
more than 50% of  total own funds. They are also subject to the di- 
rective on a minimum solvability ratio. This directive determines that 
a credit institution's own funds should represent a minimum of 8% 
of  all its risk-adjusted assets. In assigning risk weights to a bank's as- 
sets, a distinction between Community and non-EC borrowers is made 
as well  as between  public,  semi-public and private  borrowers.  All 
these requirements closely follow the international standards set out 
by  the Bank for International Settlements. 
The concept of  essential requirements has become a cornerstone 
of  Community legislative thinking and is gradually extended towards 
new areas of EC  regulation. The social domain provides a good exam- 
ple in this respect. Following a consensus on a charter of social rights, the Commission recently proposed minimum requirements for part- 
time, shift and night work as well  as on minimum rest periods and 
paid annual holiday. 
FIGURE 1 
The Creatron of  an I~ztemal  Market: Cost-I~zcrensi~zg  Barriers 
111.  ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, MARKET SEGMENTA- 
TION AND COST COMPETITIVENESS 
In this section, we analyze the economic effects of mutual recognition 
and home country control when national standards and regulations 
impose adjustment costs on foreign firms. We first show that different 
national standards and regulations lead to market segmentation. Sub- 
sequently, we argue that mutual recognition and home country control 
eliminate this type of  market segmentation and benefits companies 
with a cost advantage. Finally, we analyze the role of  essential requi- 
rements. 
Throughout the analysis a graphical framework, adapted from cus- 
tom union theory (Robson (1987)), is used as a stylized description 
of  a complex European marketplace1 In Figure 1, we consider the 
perfectly competitive markets in two EC countries for a particular good. Firms producing in country L are assumed to have a cost ad- 
vantage over their competitors in  countiy H. For example, the low- 
cost country L might be Spain where, due to lower labor costs, cars 
or television sets can be assembled chcaper than in a high labor cost 
country like Belgium. We suppose that the product is homogeneous : 
there are no quality differences between television sets produced in 
Spain and Belgium. 
Evidently, firms of  country H and L are also competing with non- 
EC companies. In Figure 1, we assume that these producers are wil- 
ling to supply an infinite amount at the world price OW.~  To protect 
European producers against world  competition, the EC imposes an 
external tariff of  WTw on imports, which raise the price of  non-EC 
products on  the European market to OTw. 
Companies in countiy L want to exploit their cost advantage and 
export to country H. But they face adjustment costs arising from tech- 
nical, health and environmental standards or from a different regu- 
latory  environment.  In  effect,  the  absence  of  mutual  recognition 
andlor home-country control imposes a cost of TwPE per unit of out- 
put to adjust to the standards of  country H. In our example of  tele- 
vision sets, there are about six different national television reception 
standards in the EC. Adjusting to these standards renders penetration 
of  national markets less profitable.  Exporting firms therefore view 
standards and regulations as cost increasing  entry barriers. 
A. Internal Barriers and Market Segmentation 
Different standards profoundly affect the decision of low cost produ- 
cers to sell only on their home market L or to serve both markets. 
Consider the situation in market L first with domestic demand curve 
DL and industry supply curve SL. Equilibrium between  supply and 
domestic demand occurs at V with price OPL and sales OS. Hence, 
EC firms receive  OPL when they sell in  market L. 
In market H the demand curve is given by DH. The industry supply 
curve of domestic firms is given by SH. Non-EC competitors are wil- 
ling to satisfy total demand at the price OTw. Therefore, the price 
in country H cannot exceed OTw. Suppose this maximum price OTw 
were the equilibrium price. The net price for exporters of  country L 
after subtracting the adjustment cost TwPE is OPE,  which is less than 
the price they would receive in market L. Therefore, they choose to TABEL 1 
Automobile prices  net of  ta.xes  in the E. C. cozcntries in  1986, 1987 cind  1989. 
TJze cheapex! cou~t?~  eql!a!s n  vah!i. gf 100  (1) 
Country  1986  1987  1989 
Belglum  121  121  123 
West Gelmdny  129  128  137 
Denmark  100  100  100 
Spain  146  142  149 
Ireldnd  151  130  145 
France  130  128  132 
Italy  144  129  148 
Luxembourg  122  122  127 
Nethe~lansd  123  122  130 
Port~~yal  136  127  L 40 
UK  151  144  161 
G1 eece  (2)  (2)  107 
Source: Van Neder and Vanhaverbeke (1990) 
(1): Figure for  1988 are not available 
(2): No figures available for Greece in  1986 and 1987 
not to export and to sell their entire production in market L. Hence, 
the equilibrium in country L is found at point V. 
With no exports from country L, the maximum price OTw becomes 
the equilibrium price in market H. Total demand is found at point 
B and is equal to ON. Home firms produce a part OM of total demand 
(see point A on the domestic supply function). The difference bet- 
ween  domestic demand and supply  (that is AB =  MN) is  imported 
from non-EC exporters. 
This graphical derivation indicates how different standards and re- 
gulations constitute one important reason for market ~egmentation.~ 
Firms treat countries as separate entitities and fail to fully base their 
strategies on the interdependencies between the markets. Market seg- 
mentation is reflected  in  the two following features often observed 
on European markets. 
There is price discrimination for the same product across markets. 
In Figure 1, the price OTw in market H is higher than the price OPL 
in market L. As a real world example, Table 1 compares average car 
prices net of taxes in the EC ( The country with the lowest car prices, 
expressed in ECU, is given avalue of 100). The table reveals that there 
was a net of tax price average price differential of  44% to 61% in the period  1986-1989 between  the most  expensive country, the United 
Kingdom, and Denmark, the country with the lowest car prices. More 
derailed data on individuai modeis, found in Van Neder and Vanha- 
verbeke (1990 ( Appendix 1)) as well as earlier work by  Mertens and 
Ginsburgh  (1985) reveal a similar picture. 
Price discrimination  is  not confined to  the automobile  industry. 
The report on 1992 by the Commission of  the European Communities 
(1988) provides evidence of  price dispersion in important sectors as 
electronics, telecommunications and steel. The data for the financial 
sector are reproduced in Table 2. The figures represent the percen- 
tage differences in prices of financial products compared with the ave- 
rage of  the four lowest  observation^.^ We observe sharp price diffe- 
rentials for comparable banking and insurance products across EC 
countries. 
The other characteristic of  market segmentation is the protection 
offered by national standards and regulations to domestic producers. 
This is reflected in artificially high market shares of  domestic firms 
on their home market. Again the examples of the automobile and the 
financial sectors are insightful. Table 3 presents the market share of 
selected car manufacturers on four EC markets in 1988. For French, 
Italian and British automobile producers  in particular, the position 
on the home market is significantly stronger that on foreign markets. 
Table 4 shows the market shares of domestic banks and life-insurance 
companies on their home market. With the exceptions of  Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, the EC banking market is do- 
minated by  domestic banks. The domestic orientation of  life-insurance 
companies is even more outspoken. 
B. The Effects of  Mutual Recognition and Home  Country Control 
Now assume that mutual recognition or home country control is in- 
troduced. Companies based in country L can operate in market H with- 
out adjusting to the standards of country H. Television sets or phar- 
maceuticals approved in Spain can be sold everywhere in the EC. A 
French bank, supervised by  the French authorities, can carry out the 
activities included in the banking passport in all EC countries. In Fi- 
gure 1, foreign firms selling in market H do not longer incur the ad- 
justment  cost TwPE. 
This liberalization profoundly alters market conditions within the 
EC in four fundamental ways. TABLE 2 
Price  differentials  in EC barzkirzg arld  insz~rm~ce  (Percentage differences  irz  prices  of 
fiiic71iCial prodiicis  ~0iiip~?i62d  ?ii:/i  :hi fli'erage of  t!?~  fiiiir  /~it.€~t  ~bseii'flti~~i~) 
B  D  E  F  I  LNLUK 
Banking 
Consumer credit  -41  136  39  105  n.a.  26  31  121 
Credit cards  79  60  26  -30  89  -12  43  16 
Mortgages  31  57  118  78  -4  n.a.  -6  -20 
Letters of  credit  22  -10  59  -7  9  27  17  8 
Foreign exchange  6  31  196  56  23  33  -46  16 
Travellers cheques  35  -7  30  39  22  -7  33  -7 
Commercial loans  -5  6  19  -7  9  6  43  46 
Insurance 
Life  78  5  37  33  83  66  -9  -30 
Home  -16  3  -4  39  81  57  17  90 
Motor  30  15  100  9  148  77  -7  -17 
Commercial fire, theft  -9  43  24  153  245  -15  -1  -27 
Public liability  13  47  60  117  77  9  -16  -7 
Source: Commission  of  the European Communities (1988) 
TABLE 3 
Market  shares  (in 70)  of selected  EC a~ltornobile  producers  (l) 
Germany  France  Italy  United  West 
Kingdom 
Austin  2.0  1.4  15.8  0.4 
Alfa Ronleo  0.9  6.1  0.1  0.2 
BMW  1.6  1.1  1.9  5.2 
Citroen  11.7  3.2  1.8  1.7 
Fiat  5.0  44.8  3.3  4.4 
Ford  6.9  3.8  27.4  10.5 
Mercedes  1.2  1.2  1.1  10.7 
Opel  4.8  3.2  15.1  14.9 
Peugeot  20.4  3.6  4.6  3.1 
Renault  31.6  8.7  3.7  3.1 
Volkswagen  6.0  7.1  5.8  28.6 
Volvo  1.0  0.9  3.7  0.6 
Other  7.0  14.9  15.8  16.6 
TOTAAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Soulre: Van Neder (1989). 
(1): The market shares are computed based  on sales of  selected models TABLE 4 
Market shares of  do~nestlc  Onizks  and Ilfe-~nsumnce  conlpailres 
Banks'  Life-insurance 
companiesz 
Belgium  54  8S3 
Denmark  99  98 
France  90  96 
Germany  95  97 
Greece  n.a.  84" 
Ireland  89  65 
Italy  97  96 
Luxen~bourg  9  883 
Netherlands  90  95 
Portugal  97  n.a. 
Spain  89  1l.a. 
United Ihgdom  38  89 
Source:  Gilibert and Steinherr (1989). 
1. % share of domestic banks in total assets at the end of  1987 (end of  1986 for Ireland). 
2.  % of  premium  accounted for by  domestic insurance companies around 1980. 
3. The figure applies to Belgium  and Luxembourg  combined. 
4. The figure for Greece includes non-life insurance. 
Firstly, the scope for price discrimination in products with the same 
quality is reduced. Sales are continuously readjusted between markets 
in order to get the highest possible price. In our example of  complete 
liberalization, price  differences between markets  disappear. In the 
new equilibrium, there is one price in two markets. 
To determine this equilibrium price we have to construct the new 
supply curve in country H. For prices above PL, firms selling in market 
L are willing to export to country H the difference between their sup- 
ply and total demand in country L.~  Adding those exports to total do- 
mestic production in country H yields the new supply curve SH +  L. 
The new equilibrium is found at point D where demand meets supply 
in market H. The equilibrium price in both countries becomes OPI. 
The price increase in market L causes sales to fall from OS to OR. 
Conversely, in market H prices fall and consumption increases to OQ. 
Secondly, cost  leadership  plays an  essential role  in  determining 
competitive advantage in  an integrated market. High cost firms lose 
the artificial protection from the differential in national standards. In 
Figure 1, home firms in market H face a decline in sales from OM 
to OL and will be forced to rationalise. Firms previously selling ex- 
clusively in market L expand their total production from OS to OG. Thirdly, trade diversion occurs. Exporting firms located outside the 
EC  sold MN on market H before the market liberalisation. They loose 
their market share to firms located in the EC. Note that is true even 
if the level of  protection (WTw in Figure 1) remains the same. Non- 
EC exporters loose even more if  the EC  uses the 1992 project to raise 
the level of  protection. On the other hand, non-EC firms already lo- 
cated in the EC should enjoy the same benefits as EC firms. These 
facts explain the fear of  the major EC trading partners for a "fortress 
Europe" as well as the current surge of  non-EC direct investment in 
the Community. 
Finally, home country control and mutual recognition are likely to 
lead to a competition of  rules : national regulations will start to com- 
pete. Stricter national rules will be under pressure to change because 
they do not apply to foreign companies. If, say, Italian banks are sub- 
ject  to very  strict capital adequacy requirements, they  are put at a 
competitive  disadvantage with  respect  to banks from EC countries 
with  lower standards and may even decide to move elsewhere. 
C. The Economics of  Essential Requirements 
Competition of  rules is beneficial  when indefensible standards and 
superfluous regulation are eliminated. Yet, such competition runs the 
risk of an ultimate convergence towards the lowest possible standard 
in the ~ommunity?  For instance, companies may prefer to conform 
to Greek environmental standards and drug testing procedures  in- 
stead of  complying with tougher standards at home. 
The specification of EC  essential requirements is widely recognized 
as an effective  counterweight for this process of  downward harmo- 
nization. What is not commonly realized, however, is that essential 
requirements may fundamentally affect the competitive positions of 
firms within an industry. 
Imagine  in  our graphical  framework that EC essential  require- 
ments are based on the standards of country H. Companies in country 
L now incur adjustment costs to adapt their products to EC standards. 
These adjustment costs also apply to products sold on their home mar- 
ket. As a result, supply curves SL and SH +  L shift upwards in Figure 
1  (not shown). Country L's companies loose (part of) the gains in mar- 
ket share in country H, derived from the implementation of  mutual 
recognition or home country control. The competitive impact of  essential requirements explains the in- 
tensive lobbying efforts of  companies at the European Commission 
headquarters in Brussels. Having incurred the sunk cost of  adjusting 
to French standards, it matters for a French producer of precision in- 
struments that the standard of  its German competitor does not be- 
come the EC-wide norm. 
A similar reasoning applies to the debate on Europe's social di- 
mension (Abraham (1990b)). Employers in  the Southern EC coun- 
tries do not benefit from EC social minimum requirements based on 
social norms in the Northern countries. Such measures raise their la- 
bor costs and put them at a disadvantage w.r.t. their Northern com- 
petitors. 
IV. MARKET INTEGRATION, QUALITY COMPETITION 
AND REPUTATION 
So far, we assumed that all products are homogeneous and thus of 
the same quality. Standards, regulations and possibly minimum requi- 
rements merely raise costs for otherwise cost-effective firms. In rea- 
lity, products are often differentiated by quality : several brands of the 
same industrial or financial product are available on the market with 
quite distinct quality characteristics7. Consumers are willing to pay a 
price for these perceived or real differences in quality. In other words, 
they are often prepared to pay a reputation premium for e.g. a Ja- 
panese or a German car or a well-known electronics brand name. In 
the financial sector, corporate or private customers may go for a well- 
established French bank even if  an lesser known Greek institution of- 
fers a better deal. 
Strict  national  standards and uncompromising  domestic regula- 
tions are one possible way of  establishing a quality reputation. High 
domestic capital adequacy and reserve requirements help to establish 
the credit-worthiness of financial institutions. Obtaining a banking li- 
cence from the French authorities may instil more confidence than 
a Greek banking passport. Satisfying German standards for machi- 
nery is perhaps costly but signals quality to potential customers. 
A. National Standards and Regulations as Quality Indicators 
A very different view on standards and regulation emerges from these 
examples.  Strict requirements are no longer merely cost enhancing FIGURE  2 
Standards and Reg~rlations  as Q~~nlity  Indicators 
L'rrcer  ilid cuarr 
but are used by firms to differentiate their products from their com- 
petitors. In this section, we analyze the effects of home country con- 
trol, mutual recognition and essential requirements in a framework 
of  quality differentiation. 
We return to a two-country, one product framework in Figure 2, 
which is based on Falvey (1989). A range of  different varieties of  the 
product now exists as measured on the vertical axis. The lowest avai- 
lable quality of  the product, Qo, is  depicted at the origin. The ho- 
rizontal axis shows average production costs of companies in countries 
H and L for the various brands on the market. The CL and CH curves 
indicate that unit production costs increase when the quality of  the 
product  improves. 
Country H and L possess different competitive strengths. Firms of 
country L are more efficient in producing the lower quality variety 
of  the product, while  country H derives its comparative  advantage 
from specialization in higher  quality goods. In effect, unit costs are 
lower in country L than in country H for brands in the range QoQl 
but higher when the quality level of  the product exceeds Q1. For in- 
stance, country L could be Portugal exploiting its labor cost advantage 
to cheaply produce standard household appliances. The higher quality products are less costly to manufacture in Germany (countiy H) be- 
cause they require sophisticated  technology and skilled manpower. 
Consider the situation before mutual recognition or home country 
control. The authorities of  country L judge that all available brands 
are of  sufficient quality to be sold on their market. In country H all 
quality levels below Qh are deemed unacceptable and excluded from 
the market. This scenario fits in well with the generally tougher safety, 
health  and environmental standards in  Germany than in  Portugal. 
Quite likely, a comparison of regulation in the financial sector would 
reveal  a similar picture. 
The regulatory bodies of  country H submit domestic and foreign 
products to the same quality test. After passing the test, foreign pro- 
ducts  are admitted to market  H without further adjustment costs. 
Hence, we abstract entirely from the type of  adjustment costs for ex- 
porters analyzed in Section 11. 
To keep things simple, we suppose that the tests fully reveal the 
quality of  the products to potential buyers. Said differently, buyers 
accept the label "approved in Germany" as sufficient proof for the 
quality claims made by  the seller. The analysis is easily extended to 
the case where suppliers face additional costs in order to convince cus- 
tomers of  their product's quality (Falvey (1989)). 
With this assumption as well as free entry in the industry, prices 
are equal to average costs and are measured on the vertical axis. Hig- 
her quality goods carry a higher price. For the same quality, buyers 
prefer the cheapest product. Firms from country L will therefore sell 
the lower quality range QoQl in their domestic market. Since quality 
levels below Qh are barred from market H, their sales in country H 
are confined to the range QhQ1. Suppliers from countiy H capture 
the high quality market segment in both countries with quality levels 
above Q1. 
B. Tlze Effects of  M~lt~lal  Recognition and Horne  Countly  Control 
With mutual recognition and home country control, product varieties 
of  country L are no longer obliged to undergo country H's quality tests 
in order to be sold on market H. Moreover, varieties with a quality 
less than Qh cannot be refused access to market H. How do these 
changes alter the specialization pattern ? 
It is immediately clear that producers in country L of  quality levels 
below qh benefit because they obtain access to market H. Lower qua- lity Portuguese appliances appear on the German market which also 
benefits German consumers who could afford more expensive sophis- 
ticated brands. 
On the other hand, firms of  country L run the risk of  being con- 
fronted with a reputation problem. In a less regulated environment, 
it becomes more difficult for economic agents to judge the quality of 
the goods and services available. In particular, consumers in country 
H may doubt the quality of  country L's products because of the lower 
quality of  the varieties that were previously barred from market H. 
This doubt would only be reinforced if country L's higher quality pro- 
ducts do no longer submit to country H quality testing or regulations. 
In our example, German consumers may increasingly view Portuguese 
appliances as lower quality products and turn to well-established Ger- 
man brands instead. They may be unwilling to deposit funds in a Por- 
tuguese bank that is  supervised by  Portuguese rather than German 
banking authorities. 
To convince buyers of  product quality, country L's companies will 
be forced to invest in reputation building e.g. by advertising, extra war- 
ranties or improved after-sale service. The AL curve in Figure 2 de- 
picts unit costs for country L suppliers taking into account expendi- 
tures on reputation building. The distance between CL and AL re- 
flects this reputation cost which is assumed to be larger for higher qua- 
lity varieties of  the product. 
The reputation cost raises the price of country L's products. In the 
new  equilibrium, firms from country L produce  the quality  range 
QoQ2. Consequently, they loose their competitive advantage in the 
Q2Q1 part of  the product range. Another way of  saying this is that 
the firms of country H benefit from the quality reputation of their pro- 
ducts8. In short, investments in reputation pay off  in  an integrating 
European market. 
A downward convergence of standards towards the lowest standard 
in  the EC will not take place. On the contrary, firms of  country H 
build part of  their quality reputation on the country's  stricter stan- 
dards and regulations. Likewise, firms of  country L producing varie- 
ties in the range QhQl may wish to conform to country H's rather 
than country L's standards, even if  this implies supplementary adjust- 
ments costs. When meeting German standards sends a signal of  qua- 
lity to potential buyers, Portuguese companies have an incentive to 
have their product approved in Germany. In Figure 2, such strategy 
allows country L's firms to lower their reputation cost. The AL curve shifts back towards CL and country L's firms capture a larger interval 
of  the quality range. 
C. Essential Requirements and Quality Competition. 
This interpretation  of  standards and regulations  as quality  signals 
throws an interesting light on the role of  EC essential requirements. 
In Figure 2, the minimum  quality level allowed in the EC is deter- 
mined at Qec. Hence, EC requirements are stricter than country L's 
standards but less restrictive  that country H's regulations. The com- 
petitive impact of  EC essential requirements varies considerably de- 
pending on the quality characteristics of  the variety considered. 
Country L producers of varieties with a quality below Qec are worse 
off than in any of  the other systems discussed so far. As in the equi- 
librium without mutual recognition or home country control, they are 
barred from market H. In addition, they are denied the opportunity 
to sell in their home market whereas they did not face any quality re- 
strictions before. 
Suppliers from country L of goods in the quality range QecQh ad- 
vocate  essential requirements.  EC norms  allow  them to sell in  all 
countries of the EC. At the same time, the label "approved in the EC" 
may  enhance their  products'  reputation  and  therefore  strengthen 
their competitive position. 
The evaluation by  other firms, with quality levels above Qh, de- 
pends on the reputational value of the EC requirements. Suppose that 
consumers judge  that the less restrictive  Community standards are 
sufficiently reliable in measuring quality. In that case, firms in both 
countries will conform to EC standards if  doing so is less costly than 
adjusting to the tougher German regulations. In the end, we will ob- 
serve an convergence of  national standards towards the Community 
norm comparable to the process described for cost-increasing internal 
barriers. Conversely, firms will stick to the German norm if  consumers 
do not accept EC approval as a quality indicator. Under those con- 
ditions, no harmonization based on EC norms is likely to occur. In- 
stead, EC essential requirements and (a couple of) stricter national 
standards will coexist, the latter reflecting quality judgments by con- 
sumers. V. CONCLUSION 
This paper focused on three fundamental principles in the creation 
of a European single market. By now, the idea of accepting the norms 
of  the country of origin, as exemplified in the mutual recognition and 
home country control principles, has gained widespread acceptance. 
Likewise, the responsibility of  the Community in specifying essential 
requirements does not seem to be contested. In spite of  this, a com- 
parison of  the banking and insurance sector indicates that the degree 
of  liberalization varies considerably across sectors. 
National  standards and regulations  impose adjustment costs on 
firms attempting to penetrate new markets. Mutual recognition and 
home country control enable cost-efficient firms to circumvent the ar- 
tificial protection offered by cross-country differences in cost-increa- 
sing  norms.  Prices  of  comparable goods converge  across  markets. 
Companies with a cost advantage expand their market share. In an 
integrating  market  cost  competitiveness  plays  an  increasing  role, 
which explains the cost restructuring taking place in many companies 
in anticipation of  1992. 
If  meeting strict national standards norms is interpreted by  con- 
sumers as proof of product quality, the impact of mutual recognition, 
home country control and essential requirements on business strategy 
is complex. Suppliers of  the lowest quality varieties face the choice 
of either upgrading their product to meet EC essential requirements 
or being excluded from all EC  markets. Products of lower quality that 
meet EC standards obtain access to the entire Community market. 
The companies involved also benefit from a reputation effect if  EC 
regulations  are better trusted by  consumers than the standards of 
their country of origin. Higher quality firms from countries with poor 
standards suffer when consumers find it more difficult to evaluate the 
quality of the wider product choice available in a less regulated single 
European market. Uncertain buyers turn to well established brands 
with an excellent quality reputation. In an integrated market, repu- 
tation is therefore likely to matter increasingly for the upper end of 
the quality range. 
This papers conveys  the message  that companies must carefully 
take into consideration both cost and reputational aspects of confor- 
ming to a specific standard or regulation. They should realize that dif- 
ferences in cost-increasing national standards will be phased out by 
EC essential  requirements. They  should keep  informed  about the exact specification of  the relevant Community minimum norms. Fi- 
nally, they have to decide whether the competitive edge obtained from 
a better quality reputation justifies meeting national regulations that 
are stricter than EC essential requirements. If  so, a convergence of 
all national regulations towards the EC minimum requirements will 
not be observed. 
NOTES 
1. A mathematical frameword, including various models of imperfect competition, is found 
in Venables  (1990)  among others. 
2.  With this assumption,  terms-of-trade effects are ruled out. 
3. We do not mean to imply that market segmentation, price discrimination or a high do- 
mestic market share of  domestic firms are caused solely by cross-country differences in 
standards and regulations. 
4. For instance, a figure of -41 for consumer credit in Belgium indicates that this product 
is 41% below the average of the four countries with the cheapest prices for consumer 
credit. 
5. The assumption of  perfect competition rules out two-ways trade. 
6. Van Cayseele and Heremans (1991) show that downward harmonization is one possible 
outcome of  a regulation  game. 
7. There are many other reasons for product differentiation not related to quality. Nor is 
our approach to modeling quality and information the only possible one. In particular, 
we simplyfy a complex informational problem by  assuming that quality differences are 
observable. We refer the interested  reader to the Falvey article. 
8. In Figure 2, it is assumed that the reputation cost for firms in country H is zero, so that 
prices are still determined on the CH curve. An AH curve incoporating reputation costs 
for country H can be constructed and the new equilibrium determined at the intersection 
of the AL and AH  curves. Under the assumption that country H enjoys a better quality 
reputation, similar effects as discussed in the text  are obtained. 
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